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Abstract: Faith-based actors are often recognised as contributors to both confict and peace. However, 
their work to prevent violent confict, rather than bring an end to or recover from it, is largely 
unexplored. This is despite the growth of confict prevention as a global social norm and feld of 
practice. Based on collaborative research with faith groups and organisations in Nigeria, the Solomon 
Islands and Zanzibar (Tanzania), this paper examines faith-based forms of violent confict prevention. 
It argues that faith-based approaches exist on a spectrum, from instinctive and ad hoc initiatives 
run by individuals and local places of worship to large-scale, systematised interventions led by 
global faith-based development organisations. Yet, while faith-based approaches to violent confict 
prevention vary in form and function, they are consistent and distinctive in their emphasis on building 
resilient relationships at the local level, modelling forms of prevention embedded within local culture 
and that recognise the emotional and spiritual dimensions of transformative change. Faith-based 
approaches offer insights valuable to the wider confict prevention feld, which is increasingly 
critiqued for its liberal underpinnings and emphasis on technical and technological solutionism. 
Lessons emerge for others implementing prevention programmes, who could adapt elements of 
the unhurried, values-led, relationally sensitive approach demonstrated by some faith-based actors, 
albeit within their own structural limitations. Policymakers should support such adaptations and 
expand their view of prevention to explicitly include faith-based forms of activity, as to do otherwise 
risks missing opportunities and reproducing existing failures. 
Keywords: confict prevention; faith; religion; liberal peace; peacebuilding; religious violence; 
technocracy; technology 
1. Introduction 
From the atrocities of Boko Haram and Daesh to the state-sponsored persecution of Myanmar’s 
Rohingya, religiously framed violence dominates headlines and plagues lives. On the fip side, religious 
actors are also recognised for their efforts to disavow violence and support peace. Whilst both of these 
constructs are familiar, the roles that religious actors play in preventing outbreaks of political violence 
are largely unknown (Haider 2016). Based on case studies from Nigeria, the Solomon Islands and 
Zanzibar, this article introduces examples of faith-based confict prevention at local and national levels. 
It considers the contexts in which faith-based confict prevention occurs and the forms it takes, from 
refexive offers of sanctuary and safe passage to early warning and response to long-term efforts to 
address structural confict drivers and challenge cultures of violence. It investigates how faith-based 
approaches conform with, contradict and extend conventional “liberal peace” wisdom and what 
the implications of this are for confict prevention as a feld of practice. 
Faith-based actors range in form, from local faith groups and places of worship, some informally 
constituted, to international development agencies and global religious movements. All derive 
inspiration and guidance from the teachings and principles of their faith or a particular interpretation or 
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school of thought within that faith (Clarke et al. 2008). In times of violent confict and in the aftermath, 
some seek to build peace and lay foundations for recovery, shaping their existing activities to 
support peacebuilding or taking on new roles. Some faith-based actors function very similarly to 
non-faith-based peacebuilding actors—in larger faith-based international development agencies, in 
particular, day-to-day working practices may be largely indistinguishable from others in the sector. 
Recent years have seen major faith-based humanitarian organisations enter peacebuilding 
programming in a more sustained way. Organisations such as Islamic Relief, Christian Aid and 
Tearfund have recalibrated their activities in confict-affected areas, supplementing confict-sensitive 
development work with activities more explicitly framed as peacebuilding. This responds to growing 
donor interest, both in partnering with faith-based organisations (Duff et al. 2016) and in peacebuilding. 
As engagement has increased, debates around working with faith-based actors have matured. Questions 
of appropriate forms of partnership have come to the fore, along with concerns over instrumentalisation 
of faith partners and low levels of faith literacy within the development sector. New platforms for 
partnership have been created, along with “principles” (DfID 2012) and “partnership notes” (UNHCR 
2014) to guide interactions. 
The growth in faith-based peacebuilding has coincided with the development of confict prevention 
as a distinct global norm and feld of practice. The latter provides a framework to consider 
the preventative contributions of faith-based actors, but so far, the literature on the two subjects 
remains largely separate. This contrasts with the wealth of literature on religion and countering 
violent extremism or religion and atrocity prevention, which both have a similarly proactive approach 
to addressing violence. Recognising this knowledge gap, the article integrates the literature on 
confict prevention, liberal peace and faith-based peacebuilding and analyses the implications of 
faith-based initiatives for the prevention agenda and liberal peace more generally. It is signifcant in 
a number of ways. Firstly, it contributes to the knowledge base on confict prevention by expanding 
the view to include faith-based initiatives, which opens up space for critical refection of current 
prevention practice and reveals new pathways for reform. Secondly, it contributes to debates within 
the faith-based peacebuilding literature, as it sets out the parameters of faith-based confict prevention, 
as yet unestablished, and identifes avenues for further research in this underexplored area. Finally, this 
article recommends ways to adapt programming to enable deeper engagement as calls for prevention 
grow stronger. 
The paper continues with a brief methodological overview. It then provides a brief overview of 
approaches to religion within peace studies, recognising the ambivalent heritage that religious actors 
have as instigators and inhibitors of violence. Section 4 examines confict prevention, charting its 
evolution from generic aspiration to global social norm and feld of practice, and Section 5 considers 
confict prevention as an extension of the liberal peace agenda. Section 6 documents case studies 
of faith-based forms of confict prevention, identifying common themes linked to the faith-based 
organisations’ dual identities as local and spiritual actors. Three persistent weaknesses of confict 
prevention are then unpacked in order to examine the extent to which faith-based initiatives conform 
with, contradict and extend conventional “liberal peace” wisdom. The fnal section concludes, refecting 
on the extent to which faith-based initiatives can add value and identifying pathways for future research. 
2. Methodology 
The data that inform this research were collected through two projects. The frst was The 
Faith-Based Confict Prevention and Early Warning Scoping Project, a collaboration between academics and 
the Anglican network of churches, the world’s third largest church grouping. The project analysed 
the experiences of faith groups working to prevent confict in Nigeria and the Solomon Islands through 
interviews, focus groups and participant observation at meetings and workshops, exploring what is 
distinctive about faith-based approaches. In the Nigerian cities of Jos and Kaduna, researchers engaged 
with 249 respondents across 30 organisations in 32 sessions, observing interfaith organisations as well 
as Christian-led initiatives. In Honiara, Solomon Islands, researchers interviewed 23 leaders from faith 
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organisations and other entities, interacting with 98 additional respondents through workshops and 
faith group activities. Respondents included members of the Melanesian Brotherhood, an Anglican 
religious order of lay brothers unique for its large size and relative youthfulness, as the option to 
renew vows intermittently makes it a popular choice for young men to live in a spiritual community 
for a fxed time. In both contexts, respondents included a mix of ordained faith leaders and lay 
people, peacebuilding practitioners and development workers, community members involved in 
peacebuilding activities, and donors and policymakers. 
Data also come from a second project, From Early Warning to Response in Preventing Violence: 
Transforming Confict Through Citizen Engagement, in collaboration with the Action Support Centre 
(South Africa). Through participatory action research, the project investigated the effectiveness of 
information, communication and technology (ICTs) in confict early warning and early response 
initiatives. This paper includes insights from Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous region of Tanzania, where 
the local partner was the Zanzibar Interfaith Centre. 
A full analysis of the confict dynamics in each area is beyond the scope of this paper, but extensive 
confict analyses were conducted with partners in each country to situate the research, mapping 
confict issues, key stakeholders and peacebuilding assets. In all cases, respondents identifed multiple 
competing forms of confict. In Nigeria and Zanzibar, respondents identifed religious dimensions 
to conficts, though this was not necessarily the central issue. Often, religion was the fault line upon 
which opinion was divided or a surface narrative framing other concerns. In Zanzibar, for instance, 
a prescient issue for respondents was unease with rapid modernisation and Westernisation, epitomised 
through mass tourism. Zanzibaris receive minimal fnancial beneft from this, whilst struggling to cope 
with the associated uncontrolled migration and perceived moral decay (Keshodkar 2013). According 
to local partners, religion intersects by providing an Islamic moral traditionalism as an alternative to 
“Western” immodesty and decadence. In all areas, religion was identifed as one of many identity 
markers infuencing peace and confict dynamics, alongside others such as ethnicity, indigeneity 
and class. 
For both projects, the interviews, focus groups and workshops were designed by a mixed team of 
academic researchers and faith-based research partners. For each session, responses were transcribed 
by two researchers who later validated their fndings with each other. Data were grouped into themes 
by the team, and synthesised fndings were later presented to a wider group of external stakeholders, 
both faith-based and secular, who have experience and expertise in the sector. 
As the literature review will show, the academic exploration of faith-based forms of confict 
prevention is in its infancy. An empirical approach, based on case studies, was chosen to gain an 
overview of the substance, extent and impact of faith-based confict prevention initiatives. The format 
of knowledge exchange with faith-based partners was also important, as it provided ways to bridge 
contextual and thematic expertise, mitigate asymmetric power relationships, avoid extractive research, 
recognise colonial legacies and ultimately “do no harm”. The methodology refects a move towards 
participatory approaches and knowledge networking with religion and development (Bompani 2019) 
and peace studies (Verkoren 2006) more generally. These forms of research come with challenges, 
notably the possible infuence of partners’ biases on the research process and fndings. Researchers 
were mindful of this and introduced checks and balances, including systematic research design 
and external feedback, but ultimately found that working within mixed academic/practitioner and 
secular/faith-based teams supported a research culture that was conscious of positionality, refective 
and frank in assessing successes and failures. 
In analysing faith-based forms of confict prevention, both projects avoided seeking grand theories 
and narratives to “explain” the phenomenon. Scholars have often highlighted the pitfalls of making 
sweeping statements regarding the roles of religious actors in peace and confict, instead recognising 
the overall “ambivalence of the sacred” (Appleby 2000; Philpott 2007). Ultimately, this article seeks to 
identify what faith-based forms of confict prevention can be, rather than what they defnitively are. 
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3. Religion, Confict and Peacebuilding 
Links between religion, confict and violence are complex and much interrogated, but those 
between religion and peacebuilding receive less attention. This refects a tendency of scholars to 
study peace through its absence rather than its presence and the biases of a largely secular academy 
(Shannahan and Payne 2016). Within the social sciences, religion is often side-lined, including in 
disciplines such as international relations (Johnston and Sampson 1994) and development studies 
(Bompani 2019). Within peace studies, however, a strong and coherent body of scholarship around 
religious engagement in peacebuilding has emerged. Many analyses of this coalesce around Appleby 
(2000) work on the “ambivalence of the sacred”, which acknowledges that religious actors are 
important “purveyors of ideas” (Haynes 2011) capable of driving both confict and peace. Scholars 
have examined a spectrum of different forms of faith-based action, including in mediation, dialogue 
and track-II diplomacy (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009; Toft et al. 2011; Johnstone and 
Svensson 2013), humanitarianism, development and displacement (Ager et al. 2015), and post-confict 
reconstruction, reconciliation and trauma resolution (Putman et al. 2011). Case studies document 
initiatives within Christianity (Sampson and Lederach 2000; Appleby 2000; Johnston and Sampson 
1994), Islam (Abu-Nimer 2003) and non-Western religions (Galtung and MacQueen 2008; Neumaier 
2004). A growing body of work also highlights the role of religious women in peacebuilding (Hayward 
2015; Hayward and Marshall 2015). 
4. The Evolution of Confict Prevention as a Global Norm and Field of Practice 
In essence, confict prevention is the effort to prevent tomorrow’s violence today. As such, it is 
relevant at any stage of confict where violence is anticipated. It requires the proactive identifcation 
of confict triggers and a subsequent response to prevent violence from breaking out or escalating 
and thus entails both foresight and action. Operational prevention responds to the imminent onset of 
violence through early warning and response, often using monitoring data provided by feld monitors, 
volunteers or the public. Flagship initiatives have emerged, including CEWARN, an East African model 
to prevent cross-border pastoralist conficts through stakeholder collaboration, information sharing 
and formulating response options. Structural prevention addresses the underlying causes of confict, 
aiming to transform these for the long term. The drive for prevention stems from the recognition that 
prevention is cheaper than cure (Chalmers 2006) and awareness that confict is a barrier to progress, 
exacting a heavy toll on human life and on economic, social and political systems. It also refects a turn 
to discourses of prevention and precautionary policymaking more generally, in areas as varied as 
health, early years interventions, poverty, criminality and climate change (Coote 2012; Gough 2013). 
Confict prevention is at the United Nations’ (UN) core, with its renowned preamble beginning, 
“We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind . . . ”. Its development as 
a global norm and feld of practice came in the Boutros-Ghali era, with the development of “preventative 
diplomacy” in the 1992 Agenda for Peace. Successive Secretary Generals maintained focus, with 
Annan shifting to a “culture of prevention”, Ban Ki-Moon declaring 2012 the “year of prevention” and 
current Secretary General Guterres declaring prevention the number one priority. The Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) was adopted by all UN member states in 2005, with the UN developing early warning 
capacity to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
At the regional level, the European Union (EU) adopted confict prevention as an explicit objective 
through the Lisbon Treaty (Vanheusden 2010). The African Union (AU) developed preventative tools 
within the Africa Peace and Security Architecture. In 2017, it adopted the AU Master Roadmap on 
Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns by 2020. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
has focused on “preventative diplomacy”, a state-centric approach to prevent confict between member 
states while respecting strong norms of sovereignty that exist within the region (Della-Giacoma 2011). 
Other regional and sub-regional organisations have their own frameworks. Whilst the development 
of prevention architectures at regional level is undoubtedly positive, they do not always live up to 
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expectations. Wulf and Debiel (2009) cite the difficulty of navigating different values and conceptions 
of sovereignty, lack of coordination and capacity and dominant regional powers as stumbling blocks. 
The practice of confict prevention originally lagged behind its development as a global norm 
(Aggestam 2003) but has grown signifcantly. Whilst early generations of operational prevention tended 
to be internationally driven, recent initiatives are likely to be community focused and technology 
enabled. Local actors are now perceived to have several advantages over international organisations, 
including fexibility, efficiency, approachability and familiarity with culture and context. Forms of 
programming have become more imaginative, with interventions based on crowdsourcing, GPS 
mapping and big data being piloted and mainstreamed. Alongside civil society programmes, there 
has also been a “privatisation” of prevention, with the business sector developing its own initiatives 
in response to public pressure (Haufer 2004). These tend to focus on the extractive industries, with 
a prominent example being the Kimberley Process Certifcation Scheme for diamond mining (Haufer 
2010). 
As confict prevention has developed, criticisms have emerged that its practice appears weak 
compared to its promise (Aggestam 2003; Matveeva 2006; Wulf and Debiel 2009). Operational 
and structural approaches are not always well aligned, refecting their divergent understandings 
of confict and prevention (Aggestam 2003). Indicators that facilitate operational prevention can 
have a “straight-jacketing” effect and provide a negative basis for analysis, measuring communities’ 
risks and exposure to violence but not their resilience and capacities (Anderson and Wallace 2012). 
Challenges exist in relation to the credibility and reliability of evidence and a persistent gap often 
remains between warning and response. Community-based organisations may have been brought into 
the fold, but international actors often engage in ways that are extractive (Saferworld and Conciliation 
Resources 2016), for instance by harvesting early warning data from local partners upon which they 
are unable to act. Such engagement lacks effectiveness and is ethically questionable, as it depletes local 
partners of time and energy without the prospect of results. 
Finally, the analysis and critique of confict prevention has been hindered by a lack of conceptual 
clarity. Firstly, the term is overused within the peace studies literature and peacebuilding sector, 
where “prevention” is often used interchangeably with “peacebuilding” and “confict resolution”. This 
imprecision risks embracing initiatives where the term prevention has been adopted but the preventative 
element is not well developed. Secondly, the term confict prevention is underused by local actors, 
including faith-based actors, who may have their own vernaculars or reject the labelling of their work 
this way. So, the challenge is two-fold: adopt a wide defnition and the distinction with other forms of 
peacebuilding is unclear; adopt a narrow defnition and local and faith-based initiatives may be excluded. 
This article strikes a balance by including all activities that are discernibly preventative, irrespective of 
whether the terminology of prevention is applied and by excluding activities that are claimed to be 
preventative but not demonstrated to be so. To assess preventative effect, the article utilises Coote (2012) 
distinction between upstream, midstream and downstream interventions. Upstream interventions 
seek to prevent harm before it occurs, targeting structural causes, midstream interventions mitigate 
the effects of harm and are usually targeted at “at risk” groups and individuals, and downstream 
interventions cope with the consequences of harm. Upstream and midstream interventions are included 
within the analysis, whereas downstream interventions are excluded. This allows the study to exclude 
forms of action that are based on what one respondent referred to as “the fre brigade approach”, where 
action is only taken reactively. 
5. Confict Prevention as an Extension of Liberal Peace 
Liberal peace claims to provide a universal ideology for peace, based on an international 
order of rational, democratic, secular, free-market and human rights-abiding states, together with 
technical processes and technologies to achieve it. For critics and proponents alike, it represents 
the internationalisation of a particular form of government—free market liberal democracy (Sabaratnam 
2011). In confict and post-confict countries, liberal peace generally focuses on the structural reform 
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of domestic institutions, the failures of which have arguably created the conditions for confict to 
emerge. These reforms may seek to establish or alter the country’s constitution, institutionalise 
democracy or raise capacity within key state functions such as the legislature, judiciary and security 
services. Such processes are political and very technical and so engender forms of peacebuilding that are 
top-down and highly professionalised. They are often promoted by the international community, which 
provides substantial engagement and sometimes muscular intervention in the way of humanitarian 
and development aid, peacekeepers and even occasionally full-scale military occupation. Whilst 
such substantial reforms may be contentious and destablising for any country, they are frequently 
enacted within “fragile states where customary law, traditional authorities and informal “indigenous” 
institutions often hold greater sway than the state (Boege et al. 2009). 
Liberal peace has its strengths, particularly for those whose rights are insecure. Yet, it also has 
signifcant ideological baggage, including Eurocentrism, technocentrism and historic connections with 
empire (Richmond and Ginty 2015). Richmond (2009) argues that in many post-confict environments, 
local opinion perceives liberal peace to be “ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, coercive 
and conditional, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards 
its subjects”. Imposed from above, it risks degrading into violence if its universal aspirations are not 
refected on the ground (Richmond 2009). Critiques of liberal peace have come from those who seek 
improvements in theory and practice but fundamentally accept the paradigm and those radically 
opposed (Chandler 2010). Many critiques revolve around notions of the “everyday” and the “local 
turn”, which recognise increased assertiveness by local actors and a loss of confdence by some 
international actors (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). The concepts of “hybridity” and “post-liberal 
peace” have also emerged, attempting to draw out more complex understandings of relationships 
between the local and the international in peacebuilding. However, these have also been critiqued 
by pro-liberal scholars, who argue that these concepts have not pointed to a clear alternative path for 
peacebuilding and that liberal peace has still done more good than harm (Paris 2010). 
Historically, religion and liberalism have been uneasy bedfellows. Cavanaugh (1995, 2009) 
charts how early proponents of the modern state system perpetuated a “myth” of religious violence 
to legitimise its liberal and secular foundations. He argues that much of this so-called religious 
violence was actually “resistance of local elites to the state building efforts of monarchs and emperors” 
(Cavanaugh 2009, p. 177). Today, the liberal peace paradigm still struggles to contend with religion, 
particularly where it challenges secular sovereignty (Mullin 2010). Religious traditions are also forced 
to reckon with liberalism, generally operating within the paradigm with varying enthusiasm. Religious 
actors must also consider their own culpability for atrocities perpetrated under ostensibly liberal 
state-building, such as colonialism (Lynch 2015). Yet, as Gopin (2015) reminds us, it is easy to overstate 
the differences between liberal peace and religious models, as enlightenment principles such as peace, 
human rights and democracy are also rooted in religious texts and practices. 
Over the past several years, religious peacebuilding scholars have begun to deconstruct liberal 
peace and its implications for faith-based peacebuilding. Appleby and Lederach offer a corrective in 
their concept of strategic peacebuilding (Lederach and Appleby 2010), which pursues peace with justice 
(“justpeace”) and embraces elicitive methods that foreground indigenous knowledge and culture over 
expert input, shifting agency further towards the local (Appleby 2015). In substance and approach, 
strategic peacebuilding articulates at least a partial rejection of liberal peacebuilding, which Appleby 
characterises as “Western, bureaucratic, ends-driven, materialist and top-down” (Appleby 2015, p. 190). 
Given the overwhelming pervasiveness of the liberal peace paradigm, the development of confict 
prevention as norm and practice has necessarily taken place within it (Hauge et al. 2015). Most forms 
of confict prevention have shorter term goals than peacebuilding, geared more towards the aversion 
of violence and the maintenance of stability, but its function is ultimately to provide an enabling 
environment for liberal peacebuilding. The practice of prevention also shares key characteristics with 
liberal peace, with its privileging of external knowledge and models and its technocratic approach. 
The literature examining confict prevention as a liberal peace project is small but critical. Jacobsen 
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and Jacobsen and Engell (2018) argue that prevention is an extension of liberal interventionism. Their 
view is that interventionism has retreated but has been replaced by new forms of technology-enabled 
intervention under the rubric of prevention. Others argue that liberal peace approaches to prevention 
can undermine communities’ capacity to prevent confict, for instance by omitting to identify what is 
already working locally (Anderson and Wallace 2012) or by emphasising security and political reform 
at the expense of socio-economic changes (Hauge et al. 2015). 
Many of the key criticisms of confict prevention emerge from its ideological underpinnings in 
the liberal peace. Here, this paper briefy analyses three—its technocratic disposition, overreliance 
on information and communication technologies (ICTs) and short-termism. These are not the only 
criticisms of liberal peace, and they are not all to which liberal peace should be reduced. However, they 
are prominent and observable hallmarks of the concept that can be readily operationalised and thus 
provide a framework for comparing classical liberal peace interventions with those implemented by 
religious actors. The paper revisits these three areas again later to consider the potential value added 
by faith-based approaches. 
5.1. Technocratic Disposition 
Technocracy has its advantages, especially in confict-affected environments (Mac Ginty 
2018). However, liberal peacebuilding has been criticised for being increasingly technocratic and 
professionalised, which poses barriers to local ownership and participation. Kurtz and Meyer (2018) 
argue that technocratic understandings of confict prevention are now widespread, based on positivist 
confict forecasting and toolbox approaches to “what works”, delivered with a heavy dose of “wishful 
thinking” about warning–response dynamics. They call for greater focus on the “art” of confict 
prevention, paying closer attention to the informal, individual and political dimensions of the endeavour. 
Religious peacebuilding scholars have also underlined the creativity and discernment needed for 
sustainable peacebuilding, which technocracy and formulaic approaches can stife. As Lederach 
(2001, p. 203) notes, “Authentic reconciliation will never be packaged and delivered at drive-through 
windows”. 
5.2. Over-Reliance on Information and Communication Technologies 
ICT for confict prevention has had some high-profle successes, such as the Ushahidi 
project’s mapping of election violence1 and Una Hakika’s countering of misinformation through 
its “WikiRumours” software.2 At their best, ICTs facilitate information sharing, communication and 
coordination, all of which are essential for collective action. Yet, they are not neutral tools, and their 
deployment is both shaped by and shapes political economy. Where violence arises from a breakdown 
in communication or a lack of accurate information, tools that improve these can theoretically help to 
prevent violence (Martin-Shields 2013). However, of course, ICTs are not a panacea. Trust is a crucial 
element in peacebuilding (De Juan and Pierskalla 2014), and where this is low, ICTs may not be effective 
(Leach 2016). So far, evidence on the impact of technology-enhanced confict prevention initiatives is 
mixed. Projects have often misfred, promoting supply-driven technical fxes, introducing unfamiliar 
and unsustainable technology and pushing technological solutions onto political problems (Leach et al. 
2015). 
5.3. Short-Termism 
Sustainable confict prevention involves substantive institutional reform to address structural 
drivers of confict, requiring long-term engagement. Yet, the temporal aspect of prevention is often 
1 Ushahidi means “witness” in Swahili. The Kenyan platform originally emerged to track post-election violence in the country 
in 2007–2008 but has now been used for many purposes across Africa. 
2 Una Hakika means “You are Certain” in Swahili. The initiative seeks to verify information and counter rumours. 
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overlooked by donors and policymakers. In fact, the liberal peace toolbox seems a hindrance to 
appropriate timing, given that donors tend to withdraw their engagement when risks escalate and 
political actors only engage when the risk of violence is high or violence is already present (United 
Nations and World Bank 2018). 
6. Faith-Based Confict Prevention 
There have been very few substantive analyses of faith-based violent confict prevention in 
the academic literature. Notable exceptions include Hertog (2010), who explores the peace-inculcating 
values and ethics of religion and the potential of these for violence prevention, and Palihapitiya (2018), 
who considers faith-based early warning systems. A small number of policy-focused refections exist 
(Haider 2016; Perchoc 2016). This is despite the fact that initiatives have long been common at the local 
level, where religious actors are well placed to respond to early signs of violence and are increasingly 
being adopted by international faith-based NGOs. National-level religious leaders often have public 
platforms to raise the alarm as peace deteriorates. Internationally, many larger faith traditions have 
secretariats and representatives at global institutions, through which they can raise issues on the global 
stage. As examples, the Holy See is a permanent observer state at the United Nations, and the Anglican 
Communion also retains a representative to the United Nations in Geneva and New York. 
In all of the case studies, respondents evidenced a range of faith-based confict prevention 
initiatives. During the confict in the Solomon Islands, young monks slept on the battle lines in 
a “middle camp” between warring militias. They provided security at the airport, allowing planes 
importing vital goods to land and preventing further deterioration of law and order. Church leaders 
escorted people in danger, providing safe passage and sanctuary. In the aftermath, monks collected 
weapons on behalf of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), preventing 
retaliatory gun violence. Church leaders mediated local disputes around land to prevent them spiralling. 
They brokered interpersonal and communal reconciliation and healing and ran training workshops on 
non-violent confict resolution. Churches were instrumental in establishing a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which included a forward-looking set of reforms “designed to prevent a recurrence of 
violence” (Jeffrey and Mollica 2017). When the government refused to release the Commission’s report, 
one Bishop controversially leaked it to the media. 
In Nigeria, religious peacebuilding initiatives were mostly led by local faith-based NGOs with 
strong ties to religious communities. Confict prevention activities included the formation of confict 
early warning and response teams and GPS mapping of violence. One organisation literally counted 
the costs of confict with villages (what is the cost of a dead cow, a burned-out building, the loss of 
a breadwinner). Thinking long term, another organisation ran interfaith youth livelihood programmes, 
including a residential farm bringing together Christian and Muslim youth from different ethnic 
groupings in shared dormitories. Women’s faith groups ran religious literacy classes with prisoners, 
pushing back against attempts to justify violence through religious doctrine. A high point for religious 
peacemakers was the signing of the Kaduna Peace Declaration of Religious Leaders in 2002. Musa 
(2016) argues that this had an immediate preventative effect: when Kaduna’s Muslim youth rioted 
against Nigeria hosting the Miss World Beauty pageant, Christian and Muslim leaders were proactive 
in quelling violence. A total of 250 people were killed in the Miss World riots; two years previously, 
the shari’a riots claimed over 2500 lives. 
Finally, in Zanzibar, a Joint Committee of Religious Leaders regularly sought to deescalate tensions 
by dispelling rumours and appealing for calm. An interfaith organisation ran activities to promote 
peace during elections, improve community policing and enable youth to advocate for peace. They 
have also set up more than 300 local peace committees throughout the island to monitor peace.3 
An in-depth analysis of the Committee’s work has been conducted by Langås (2019). 3 
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In all cases, respondents could identify highly localised indicators of potential violence. These 
included chieftain disputes, lorries on the road at night (signifying illicit activities and the breakdown 
of law and order), violence in neighbouring areas, the unexpected arrival of strangers, rumours 
circulating by SMS, a ban or curfew on motorcycle drivers, adversaries relocating cattle, circulation of 
leafets in the market and proselytising during other faiths’ religious holidays. Longer term indicators 
included “irregular” migration (with irregular in this instance referring to migration against customary 
practices), ethnic segregation/ghettoisation of inner-city areas, the sweeping aside of unaddressed 
grievances and rapid cultural change/Westernisation. Respondents could also connect these to global 
triggers, including the Danish cartoon controversy of 2002, in which a Danish newspaper published 
cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed as a terrorist, and the fall of Gaddaf in Libya, which 
increased access to small arms. 
In conducting their prevention activities, faith-based actors were found to beneft from three 
forms of overlapping capital: local capital, on the one hand, and religious and spiritual capital on 
the other. In this article, local capital refers to the strengths and advantages that local actors may 
have by virtue of their positioning and proximity to communities. As such, it is an extension of social 
capital, a term popularised by Putnam (2000) to denote a public good derived from “connections 
among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them”. In the case studies, local faith-based organisations often utilised local capital—they were quick 
to pick up on and interpret subtle changes in confict indicators, given their familiarity with local 
norms, culture, practices and vernacular. They were also known entities with an existing store of 
goodwill upon which to draw. 
Religious capital refers to the practical contributions made by faith groups based on their resources, 
while spiritual capital refers to the ethical, theological, scriptural and spiritual values that energise 
this (Baker 2009). Some defnitions combine both forms of capital under the same heading of either 
“religious” or “spiritual”, but there is greater conceptual clarity in separating the two. “The spiritual is 
associated with the personal, the intimate, the interior and the experiential, contrasted with ‘religion’, 
which is associated with the official, the external and the institutional, often picking up negative 
connotations of the hierarchical and patriarchal along the way” (Guest 2007; Heelas 2002). Of course, 
a long tradition of philosophers, from Marx (1844) to Weber (1964) to Bourdieu (1987), highlight that 
the use of religious and spiritual capital is not always benign. Few religious peacebuilding scholars 
would dispute this—indeed, it is further evidence of the ambivalence of the sacred. 
In the case studies, faith-based actors strongly utilised their religious capital. Most had access to 
well-located premises for meetings and activities. Often, religious leaders had access to other local 
leaders, including those in politics, media and the aid sector. In Nigeria, some faith leaders had their 
own TV talk shows. Depending on their circumstances and institutional structures, many leaders 
could escalate matters to national and international leaders through denominational, ecumenical and 
interfaith networks. Faith groups also had their own fnancial resources, which, though small, offered 
a level of stability and continuity. 
Critically, faith groups also utilised their spiritual capital. Activities observed by the research 
team were distinctly value driven, emphasising concepts of justice, compassion and human fourishing 
and affirming these through prayer and the use of religious doctrine, storytelling and symbolism. This 
was done as a matter of conviction, rather than utility, but nevertheless had the potential to allow 
people to move beyond their own interests and look at the common good. The use of religious ritual 
and symbolism was often important for communities—in the Solomon Islands, the hands of former 
combatants were symbolically washed when they handed over their weapons, signifying a spiritual 
cleansing that was meaningful for them. Respondents explained how prevention activities were 
designed to connect at an individual’s innermost levels, going beyond the cognitive to enter what 
some might see as a spiritual realm or what others might see as an emotional or psychological one. 
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Only church vehicles could pass through the [militia] camps, but once our vehicle was stopped. 
The priest came back and told me, and I said ‘go and tell them that vehicle is a church. If they hold it, 
they are holding a church’. (Christian faith leader, Solomon Islands). 
This readiness to engage more deeply is important, as emotions are an essential part of transforming 
confict (Bramsen and Poder 2018). It also gives activities credence: “You need some theological basis, 
or this is just a government agenda” (Christian faith leader, Nigeria). 
Of course, faith-based engagement in confict prevention is far from perfect. Some religious actors 
are openly hostile to such initiatives and may even be key confict protagonists. In Nigeria, respondents 
explained that hate preaching by religious leaders contributes to violence: “Before preaching was very 
balanced, but today it can be too extreme” (Muslim faith leader, Nigeria). Nor are faith-based actors 
immune from the creeping elitism that the wider feld of confict prevention has been charged with. 
“Interfaith work is all up, up, up, they will continue going up until they meet Jesus! But there are 
people down there. We need to go much more local. Relationships have to be formed at a local level, 
between youth” (Christian youth leader, Nigeria). Where faith groups have a middle-class bias, they 
can also struggle to access those most easily mobilised into violence, who are often youth from poor 
families. In the Solomon Islands, the monks of the Melanesian Brotherhood were roughly the same age 
as the militias and, in some cases, had been to school with them, enabling them to build rapport. In 
Nigeria, however, one civil society leader observed that religious leaders were losing infuence over 
youth, with implications for their prevention work: “The religious leaders aren’t following youth, they 
aren’t at the football felds, and youth are major actors” (Civil society leader, Nigeria). 
7. Confict Prevention: Lessons from Faith-Based Initiatives? 
This fnal section of the paper revisits the three criticisms of confict prevention set out earlier and 
identifes the potential added value of faith-based initiatives. 
7.1. Technocratic Disposition 
In the case studies, faith-based organisations tended to prioritise relationship-building and shifts 
in perspective ahead of tactical attempts to moderate or problem-solve issues. After all, “When you 
develop infrastructure instead of humanity, they will just come and blow it up” (Muslim faith leader, 
Nigeria). Whilst some initiatives targeted particular individuals, many others focused on changing 
relationships and attitudes within the whole community. This echoes the relational consciousness that 
many religions embrace—and that, incidentally, many liberal thinkers tend to downplay (Hay 2000): 
We don’t just tackle the youth who go and fght, we consider the women who cook for them 
and the men who buy them pure water, the politicians and the prominent men and women, 
and the market traders who sell guns. 
(Faith-based development worker, Nigeria) 
Relationships between religious leaders of different faiths were recognised as particularly 
important, as they have signifcant infuence over their followers: “For us preventing violence 
means continuous dialogue. 99% of our work is confict prevention. If leaders are talking, everyone 
will be calm” (Inter-faith worker, Zanzibar). The authenticity of relationship was also important, as, 
otherwise, initiatives lose legitimacy: “There are people in [the Muslim faith] I can trust. One imam is 
bent on telling the truth, he is educated in the Bible and the Quran. We call each other when things are 
bad” (Christian faith leader, Nigeria). 
7.2. The Reliance on ICTs in Confict Prevention 
In the case studies, faith-based actors displayed varying levels of engagement with ICTs for confict 
prevention. In some countries, such as Nigeria, organisations make substantial use of technology. 
In others, such as the Solomon Islands, they do not. The key factors mediating this appear to 
be the availability of communications infrastructure, local culture and donor priorities. None of 
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the respondents idealised technology, and many emphasised that analogue communications are still 
relevant in their context. Flyers stir hostilities in Zanzibar markets; newspapers distort information in 
Nigeria. In the Solomon Islands, word of mouth is still a critical form of information exchange, given 
the low penetration and prohibitively high costs of modern telecommunications: 
Not everyone has a radio. A newspaper costs 5 dollars—two packets of noodles. When 
people don’t get information, they create their own information. And the coconut wireless is 
much faster than the mobile phones. 
(RAMSI representative, Solomon Islands) 
Generally, faith-based organisations were discerning in their use of technology, recognising when 
it helped and hindered. In some cases, respondents were wary because of instances in which technology 
has helped to incite violence by spreading rumours: 
After [recent youth violence] we asked what caused the problem? The youth said rumours. 
This is the disadvantage of technology. The illiterate, semi-literate don’t have the sense or 
time to say this sort of rumour is not true, or let me verify it. They just react. 
(Muslim faith leader, Nigeria) 
However, faith-based organisations are not invulnerable to technological misadventures either. 
One organisation ran a successful confict early warning initiative based on monitoring teams comprised 
of local volunteers, who were able to refer issues to the organisation for early mediation. Based on 
this, an international donor offered to sponsor a technology-enhanced project whereby local people 
could report incidents by SMS, which could then be plotted on a GPS map in an incident room. Before 
long, the project became redundant—an expensive duplication of the existing initiative but requiring 
additional technical skill that few in the organisation had mastered. 
7.3. Short-Termism 
Where faith-based actors are reliant on donor funding, they are subject to the same timing issues 
encountered by other organisations. Often though, faith-based organisations have access to their own 
resources, which enables them to engage refexively over a longer period of time. In the case studies, 
faith groups ran some activities that were intentionally short-term and operational, but much of their 
work was also structural, designed to break the cycle of violence over generations. Moreover, when 
respondents were asked about their perspective on timing, their call was not to speed up, but to slow 
down, and to invest in long-term initiatives that lay the foundations of peace: 
To me, [confict] prevention sounds like an immediate solution, but actually we need to 
do our homework. A whole generation has grown up with hatred in their hearts, in their 
families and communities. So we need to pay more attention there. 
(Christian faith leader, Nigeria) 
8. Conclusions 
There has been a demonstrable “turn” to both religion and the local in recent years. This article 
investigates actors in both of these domains of confict prevention, who in this case overlap, in order 
to question some of the conventional assumptions about prevention that emerge from its roots in 
liberal peace. 
Having documented faith-based confict prevention initiatives in three countries, this article has 
argued that in some cases they appear to make a meaningful impact in reducing violence. However, to 
what extent can the successes of local faith-based organisations be attributed to their localness, their 
faith-basis or both? Clearly, there are instances where localness is key, as this enables organisations to 
“read” situations and respond appropriately. However, there are also instances where an organisations’ 
religious character can play a decisive role—for instance, in persuading former combatants to give up 
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their weapons and be spiritually cleansed. Ultimately, the organisations in the study had both local 
capital and spiritual and religious capital and used them both. 
In some ways, the faith-based approaches studied here conform with “liberal peace” wisdom, 
as they affirm the fundamental soundness of investing in confict prevention through peacebuilding 
initiatives and the practical gains that can be made. This is unsurprising, as they exist within a wider 
liberal framework and use many of the same models and approaches. Faith-based approaches also 
provide some useful counterpoints, highlighting liberal peace’s susceptibility to quick wins, formulas 
and technological solutionism. These are serious weaknesses within the liberal peace framework, 
identifed through existing critiques, but none are insurmountable. Indeed, they could all be addressed 
through reform of the liberal peace agenda, or failing this, could be partially offset by adaptations in 
current programming. Faith-based approaches offer glimpses of such adaptations, many of which 
could be replicated by others. Firstly, they foreground values such as justice, compassion and 
human fourishing. For faith-based actors these values are religiously inspired, but they are also 
universal values that the wider peacebuilding sector can seek to engender. Secondly, faith-based 
approaches emphasise the importance of relationships, recognising their signifcance in explaining 
people’s behaviour and motivation for change. This is habitual for many faith traditions, which 
stress relationality and the common good, but contrasts with the liberal peace view of the individual 
as self-governing. Thirdly, faith-based approaches allow participants to engage deeply, bringing in 
different dimensions of their experience, including spirituality and emotion. 
Expanding our view of confict prevention to include faith-based actors also addresses 
a methodological blind spot. Generalisations about confict prevention are becoming more 
commonplace as the feld develops, but they cannot hold true unless they capture the entirety 
of the endeavour, including initiatives that are faith-based, secular and hybrid. Faith-based initiatives 
require us to think about peacebuilding vernacular and how far it does and does not travel, and in 
so doing, it reminds us to scrutinise how accurately and strategically actors use the term “confict 
prevention” in general. 
The case study approach used in this article was adopted as a frst step to exploring a largely 
unresearched topic. Based on its fndings, several pathways for future research have emerged. A 
theological exploration of the underpinnings and expressions of confict prevention norms in different 
faith traditions would add another dimension to existing insights. The current research has also 
focused on faith-based actors at the leadership level, but what about ordinary religious people? As 
one respondent would have it, “Many people have no sympathy for dialogue or prevention, they 
are not theologically convinced. We see the same faces in dialogues, they are interfaith practitioners. 
What about ordinary people, what theological basis do they have?” (Muslim faith leader, Zanzibar). 
Is this true, and if it is, does it matter? Finally, another dimension to explore lies in the differences 
between faith-based confict prevention and countering violent extremism initiatives, which also 
involve religious groups in preventative actions. Would the two concepts provide similar insights into 
the liberal and the local, and if not, how would they differ? 
Funding: This research was funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council through the Faith-based 
confict prevention and early warning scoping project, grant number ES/L002116/1. The APC was funded by RCUK 
through a block grant to Coventry University. The Zanzibar Case Study was funded through Making All Voices 
Count, an initiative supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and 
the Omidyar Network, and implemented by a consortium consisting of Hivos, IDS and Ushahidi. 
Acknowledgments: Organisations that have contributed to the projects underpinning this research include 
the Anglican Alliance (UK), the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Reconciliation Ministry (UK), the Action Support 
Centre (South Africa), Local Peace Committees in Gauteng Province (South Africa), People’s Voice for Peace 
(Uganda) and the Zanzibar Interfaith Centre (Tanzania). 
Conficts of Interest: The author declares no confict of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study; 
in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish 
the results. 
Religions 2020, 11, 167 13 of 16 
References 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 2003. Non-Violence and Peacebuilding in Islam: Theory and Practice. Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida. 
Ager, Joey, Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Alastair Ager. 2015. Local faith communities and the promotion of 
resilience in contexts of humanitarian crisis. Journal of Refugee Studies 28: 202–21. [CrossRef] 
Aggestam, Karin. 2003. Confict Prevention: Old Wine in New Bottles? International Peacekeeping 10: 12–23. 
[CrossRef] 
Anderson, Mary B., and Marshall Wallace. 2012. Opting Out of War: Strategies to Prevent Confict. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation. Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefeld Publishers. 
Appleby, R. Scott. 2015. The new name for peace? Religion and development as partners in strategic peacebuilding. 
In The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Confict and Peacemaking. Edited by Atalia Omer, Appleby R. Scott and 
David Little. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Baker, Chris. 2009. Blurred encounters? Religious literacy, spiritual capital and language. In Faith in the Public 
Realm: Controversies, Policies and Practices. Edited by Adam Dinham, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes. 
Bristol: Polity Press. 
Bercovitch, Jacob, and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana. 2009. Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors 
in International Confict Resolution. International Negotiation 14: 175–204. [CrossRef] 
Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements, and Anna Nolan. 2009. Building peace and political community in 
hybrid political orders. International Peacekeeping 16: 599–615. [CrossRef] 
Bompani, Barbara. 2019. Religion and development: Tracing the trajectories of an evolving sub-discipline. Progress 
in Development Studies 19: 171–85. [CrossRef] 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1987. Legitimation and structured interests in Weber’s sociology of religion. In Max Weber: 
Rationality and Modernity. Edited by Sam Whimster and Scott Lash. London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 119–36. 
Bramsen, Isabel, and Paul Poder. 2018. Emotional Dynamics in Confict and Confict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof 
Foundaton. 
Cavanaugh, William T. 1995. A fre strong enough to consume the house: The wars of religion and the rise of 
the state. Modern Theology 11: 397–420. [CrossRef] 
Cavanaugh, William T. 2009. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Confict. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Chalmers, Malcolm. 2006. Spending to save? The cost-effectiveness of confict prevention. Defence and Peace 
Economics 18: 1–23. [CrossRef] 
Chandler, David. 2010. The uncritical critique of ‘liberal peace’. Review of International Studies 36: 137–55. 
[CrossRef] 
Clarke, Gerald, Michael Jennings, and Timothy Shaw. 2008. Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: 
Bridging the Sacred and the Secular. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Coote, Anna. 2012. The Wisdom of Prevention. London: New Economics Foundation. 
De Juan, Alexander, and Jan Henryk Pierskalla. 2014. Civil war violence and political trust: Microlevel evidence 
from Nepal. Confict Management and Peace Science 33: 67–88. [CrossRef] 
Della-Giacoma, Jim. 2011. Preventative diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Redefning the ASEAN way. In Preventative 
Diplomacy: Regions in Focus. Edited by Francesco Mancini. New York: International Peace Institute, pp. 28–35. 
DfID. 2012. Faith Partnership Principles: Working Effectively with Faith Groups to Fight Global Poverty. London: DfID. 
Duff, Jean, Mark Battcock, Azza Karam, and Adam Russell Taylor. 2016. High level collaboration between 
the public sector and religious and faith-based organizations: fad or trend? The Review of Faith and International 
Affairs 14: 95–100. [CrossRef] 
Galtung, Johan, and Graheme MacQueen. 2008. Globalizing God: Religion, Spirituality and Peace. Germany: 
Transcend University Press. 
Gopin, Marc. 2015. Negotiating secular and religious contributions to social change and peacebuilding. In 
The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Confict and Peacemaking. Edited by Atalia Omer, Appleby R. Scott and 
David Little. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gough, Ian. 2013. The political economy of prevention. British Journal of Political Science 45: 307–27. [CrossRef] 
Religions 2020, 11, 167 14 of 16 
Guest, Matthew J. 2007. In search of spiritual capital: the spiritual as a cultural resource. In The Sociology of 
Spirituality. Edited by Keiran Flanagan and Peter C. Jupp. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 181–200. 
Haider, Huma. 2016. Religious leaders and the prevention of election violence. GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services 
Helpdesk Research Report. Available online: https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HDQ1366.pdf 
(accessed on 3 April 2020). 
Haufer, Virginia. 2004. International diplomacy and the privatization of confict prevention. International Studies 
Perspectives 5: 158–63. [CrossRef] 
Haufer, Virginia. 2010. The Kimberley Process Certifcation Scheme: An innovation in global governance and 
confict prevention. Journal of Business Ethics 89: 403–16. [CrossRef] 
Hauge, Wenche, Rachelle Doucet, and Alain Gilles. 2015. Building peace from below—The potential of local 
models of confict prevention in Haiti. Confict, Security and Development 15: 259–82. [CrossRef] 
Hay, David. 2000. Spirituality versus individualism: Why we should nurture relational consciousness. International 
Journal of Children’s Spirituality 5: 37–48. [CrossRef] 
Haynes, Jeffrey. 2011. Religion, Politics and International Relations: Selected Essays. London: Routledge. 
Hayward, Susan. 2015. Women, Religion, and Peacebuilding. In The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Confict and 
Peacemaking. Edited by Atalia Omer, Appleby R. Scott and David Little. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hayward, Susan, and Katherine Marshall. 2015. Women, Religion, and Peacebuilding: Illuminating the Unseen. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Heelas, Paul L. F. 2002. The spiritual revolution: From ‘religion’ to ‘spirituality’. In Religions in the Modern 
World. Edited by Linda Woodhead, Paul Fletcher, Kiroko Kawanami and David Smith. London: Routledge, 
pp. 357–77. 
Hertog, Katrien. 2010. The Complex Reality of Religious Peacebuilding: Conceptual Contributions and Critical Analysis. 
Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov, and Troels Gauslå Engell. 2018. Confict prevention as a pragmatic response to a twofold 
crisis: Liberal interventionism and Burundi. International Affairs 94: 363–80. [CrossRef] 
Jeffrey, Renée, and Caitlin Mollica. 2017. The unfnished business of the Solomon Islands TRC: Closing 
the implementation gap. The Pacifc Review 30: 532–48. [CrossRef] 
Johnston, Douglas, and Cynthia Sampson. 1994. Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Johnstone, Naomi, and Isak Svensson. 2013. Belligerents and believers: Exploring faith-based mediation in 
internal armed conficts. Politics, Religion & Ideology 14: 557–79. 
Keshodkar, Akbar. 2013. Tourism and Social Change in Post-Socialist Zanzibar: Struggles for Identity, Movement and 
Civilization. Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
Kurtz, Gerrit, and Christoph O. Meyer. 2018. Is confict prevention a science, art or craft? Moving beyond 
technocracy and wishful thinking. Global Affairs 5: 23–39. [CrossRef] 
Langås, Arngeir. 2019. Peace in Zanzibar: Proceedings of the Joint Committee of Religious Leaders in Zanzibar, 2005–2013. 
New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc. 
Leach, Steven. 2016. Preventing Violence: Community-Based Approaches to Early Warning and Early Response. Zurich: 
ETH Zurich. 
Leach, Steven, Richard Smith, Chas Morrison, and Laura Payne. 2015. Can ICT Innovation Adequately 
Support Confict Prevention? Hivos Blog. January 14. Available online: https://knowledge.hivos.org/can-ict-
innovation-adequately-support-confict-prevention (accessed on 5 June 2019). 
Lederach, John Paul. 2001. Five qualities of practice in support of reconciliation processes. In Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy & Confict Transformation. Edited by Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney 
L. Peterson. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, pp. 183–93. 
Lederach, John Paul, and R. Scott Appleby. 2010. Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview. In Strategies of Peace: 
Transforming Confict in a Violent World. Edited by Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Flowers. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lynch, Cecelia. 2015. Religious Communities and Possibilities for Justpeace. In The Oxford Handbook of Religion, 
Confict and Peacemaking. Edited by Atalia Omer, Appleby R. Scott and David Little. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Mac Ginty, Roger. 2018. The limits of technocracy and local encounters: The European Union and peacebuilding. 
Contemporary Security Policy 31: 166–79. [CrossRef] 
Religions 2020, 11, 167 15 of 16 
Mac Ginty, Roger, and Oliver P. Richmond. 2013. The local turn in peacebuilding: A critical agenda for peace. 
Third World Quarterly 34: 763–83. [CrossRef] 
Martin-Shields, Charles. 2013. Inter-ethnic Cooperation Revisited: Why Mobile Phones Can Help Prevent Discrete 
Events of Violence, Using the Kenyan Case Study. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 
58: 1–13. 
Marx, Karl. 1844. Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie), 
Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. 
Matveeva, Anna. 2006. Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual Empirical Dilemmas. The Hague: European 
Centre for Confict Prevention. 
Mullin, Corinna. 2010. Islamist challenges to the ‘liberal peace’ discourse: The case of Hamas and 
the Israel-Palestine ‘peace process’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39: 525–46. [CrossRef] 
Musa, Gerald. 2016. Negotiating mutuality through peace accords: Kaduna State as a case study. Peace and Change 
41: 452–74. [CrossRef] 
Neumaier, Eva. 2004. Missed opportunities: Buddhism and ethnic strife in Sri Lanka and Tibet. In Religion and 
Peacebuilding. Edited by Harold Coward and S. Smith Gordon. New York: SUNY Press, pp. 69–92. 
Palihapitiya, Madhawa. 2018. Faith-based confict early warning: Experiences from two confict zones. The Journal 
of Interreligious Studies 24: 61–77. 
Paris, Roland. 2010. Saving liberal peacebuilding. Review of International Studies 36: 337–65. [CrossRef] 
Perchoc, Philippe. 2016. Religious Organisations and Confict Resolution (PE 593.515). Brussels: European 
Parliamentary Research Service. 
Philpott, Daniel. 2007. Explaining the political ambivalence of religion. American Political Science Review 101: 
505–25. [CrossRef] 
Putman, Katharine, Julia Lea, and Cynthia Eriksson. 2011. Cross-cultural comparison of religious coping methods 
reported by native Guatemalan and Kenyan faith-based relief providers. Journal of Psychology and Theology 
39: 233–43. [CrossRef] 
Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and 
Schuster Paperbacks. 
Richmond, Oliver. 2009. A post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the everday. Review of International Studies 35: 557–80. 
[CrossRef] 
Richmond, Oliver P., and Roger Mac Ginty. 2015. Where now for the critique of the liberal peace? Cooperation and 
Confict 50: 171–89. [CrossRef] 
Sabaratnam, Meera. 2011. A liberal peace? A brief intellectual history of international confict management, 
1990–2010. In A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding. Edited by Susanna Campbell, 
David Chandler and Meera Sabaratnam. London: Zed Books. 
Saferworld and Conciliation Resources. 2016. Effective Local Action: From Early Warning Peacebuilding. London: 
Saferworld and Conciliation Resources. 
Sampson, Cynthia, and John Paul Lederach. 2000. From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to Peaecebuilding. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shannahan, Chris, and Laura Payne. 2016. Faith-Based Interventions in Peace, Confict and Violence: A Scoping Study, 
Joint Learning Initiative for Faith and Local Communities. 
Toft, Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah. 2011. God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global 
Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 
UNHCR. 2014. Partnership Note on Faith-Based Organizations, Local Faith Communities and Faith Leaders. Geneva: 
UNHCR. 
United Nations and World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Confict. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Vanheusden, Els. 2010. Overview of the confict prevention policy of the EU. MICRON Policy Working Paper 16. 
Brighton: University of Sussex. 
Verkoren, Willemijn. 2006. Knowledge networking: Implications for peacebuilding activities. International Journal 
of Peace Studies 11: 27–62. 
Religions 2020, 11, 167 16 of 16 
Weber, Max. 1964. The Sociology of Religion. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Wulf, Herbert, and Tobias Debiel. 2009. Confict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for Enhancing 
the Effectiveness of Regional Organisations? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, GAD, ASEAN/ARF and 
PIF. London: LSE. 
© 2020 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access 
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
